Coming September 11, 2020

 

In unconventional times, perhaps we can learn from the ashes of war in how unconventional "teams" to address complex problems. The research in this book was intended to aid Generals in saving Afghanistan when originally authored (2012); now it is being used to help the likes of professional athletes to attempt an "unconventional" approach at winning on the world stage. 

 

This book hopes to ensure lost wars (and those that gave the ultimate sacrifice are not forgotten through sharing the lessons oftentimes forgotten, along with the multitude of wars called "Counterinsurgy Wars" that rarely show up in history books. 

 

Original description from 2012:

 

Controlling the population in any counterinsurgency is critical to the success of the counterinsurgent. Three historical theorists, Sir Robert Thompson, David Galula, and Robert Trinquier all agree on this pertinent issue. Success in Malaya hinged on controlling the population in New Villages. Security in Algeria depended on sectors or districts. In both examples, the raising of local security forces to control the population was essential. Two major counterinsurgency efforts were used in Vietnam in controlling the population. The Strategic Hamlet Program, led by the Republic of Vietnam, aimed at controlling the population and winning popular support to the RVN.

 

The second, and the focus of this thesis, was the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG). The CIDG program raised local security forces in the highlands of South Vietnam to protect the villages from Viet Cong influence and intimidation. Initially, the program was defensive in nature. As ground forces moved into Vietnam in 1965, the CIDG program lost its defensive focus and became offensively focused through the Mobile Strike Forces (MSF). The MSFs initially were designed to reinforce CIDG camps, but quickly became additional infantry battalions. This transition ultimately led to the degradation of the CIDG program and ultimately its disbandment.